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 OLE SPARENBERG
The Oceans: A Utopian Resource in the 20th Century
There are certainly an infinite number of ways to look at the relationship between human socie-
ties and the oceans, as man has used the sea since prehistory as a source of food and raw mate-
rials, for transportation and for warfare. Not only have the ways in which people have made use
of the sea changed over the centuries and differed from place to place, but perceptions and ideas
concerning the oceans have also altered, partly as a consequence and partly as a pre-condition
of changing uses. Alain Corbin described how the seashore was transformed in the European
mind from a place of fear to a well-regarded popular location of recreational and therapeutic
value, and how seaside resorts consequently developed from the eighteenth century onwards.1
This essay follows a similar approach based on cultural history, but it focuses on ideas and per-
ceptions relating to the sea as a source of political power and also of biological and mineral
resources. It deals with projects and ideas that linked the use of the sea with far-reaching and
often utopian expectations.
What kind of problems and anxieties made experts and the public at large turn to the sea in
search of new solutions? What promise did the imagined marine and maritime resources hold?
The period of time under examination covers the hundred years or so since the 1890s and is de-
scribed mostly from a German perspective, although the international dimension is always
taken into account. Three topics or case studies will be dealt with in detail: German navalism in
the Tirpitz era in the early years of the twentieth century, the increased exploitation of fish and
whales as part of the National Socialist drive for economic autarky in the 1930s, and finally
plans for deep-sea mining for manganese nodules from the 1960s onwards. What they have in
common is that they represent – by and large – failed projects which were based on the utilisa-
tion of the sea as an answer to perceived political and economic problems and challenges on a
larger scale. Furthermore, they are linked by a common set of ideas and suppositions about the
sea.
German navalism in the Tirpitz era
Up to the twentieth century, Germany had never been a formidable sea power. Her short North
Sea coastline – most of it hardly accessible by ship because of mud flats – did not lend itself to
the development of a strong maritime tradition. Furthermore, there was no unified German
state that would bear the costs of a navy, while the various kingdoms, duchies and Hanseatic
cities that had access to the sea only maintained a few humble craft. It was against this back-
ground that a German navy became one of the pet ideas of German liberals in the first half of
the nineteenth century who yearned for a liberal unified nation state. So the navy that had yet
to be founded was associated with liberalism and national unity. In 1841 the then popular poet
Georg Herwegh wrote an emphatic ode called Die deutsche Flotte (‘The German Fleet’) which
culminated in the line: ‘the sea, the sea makes us free!’2 Similarly, in 1843, Friedrich List, advo-
        
cate of the German tariff union and of economic unification, also had great hopes for a future
navy.3
The chance of realising this dream came with the liberal revolution in 1848 that created the
first pan-German parliament in Frankfurt. Even before the new liberal and democratic institu-
tion had firmly established itself, one of the parliament’s first decisions was to vote almost
unanimously for the foundation of a German navy. This decision was also influenced by an
ongoing conflict with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, but the deputies
were thinking far ahead of their current situation: The navy, it was hoped, would provide sup-
port for overseas trade and protect German settlers in other continents. Moreover, the fleet was
regarded as the most visible symbol of the newly-won unified nation-state. As one deputy also
explained, the sea and navigation would encourage freedom and independence in the minds of
the people, as the example of England – one of the most liberal and at the same time most sea-
minded countries – demonstrated.4 The hastily assembled fleet did well against Denmark; very
quickly, however, not the fleet but the revolution was shipwrecked when the old powers re-
established themselves and turned the clock back to the monarchic and particularistic order that
had existed prior to 1848. The fleet was subsequently disbanded in 1852, with some of its ves-
sels being taken over by the small Prussian navy. Nonetheless, the idea of a German navy
remained popular with liberal middle class Germans as a symbol of liberalism and national
unity.
With the Prussian-led unification of Germany in 1871 the Prussian navy became the Kaiser-
liche Marine (Imperial Navy), but in fact it remained a neglected annex of the army. This only
began to change in 1888 after the accession to the throne of Wilhelm II, who was an ardent ship-
lover. Furthermore, expanding the Navy seemed a logical course of action at the time, given Ger-
many’s recent colonial acquisitions of the mid-1880s, and even more so about ten years later
when she dedicated herself to the vaguely defined idea of Weltpolitik (world politics). In addition,
rapid industrialisation increased Germany’s dependence on overseas markets and resources.
However, the Navy really stepped into the limelight when Alfred von Tirpitz became Secre-
tary of the Navy in 1897. Tirpitz immediately inaugurated an ambitious fleet-building pro-
gramme and managed to win the support of the German parliament, the Reichstag, which
passed the first Fleet Law in 1898. A second Fleet Law, doubling the battle fleet, was passed in
1900 and several amendments to it followed throughout the years up to 1912. Not only was the
law’s systematic character, which exactly prescribed the Navy’s required strength and the num-
ber of ships to be built each year, new to Germany, it was also the first time the German Navy
was designed around a North Sea-based battle fleet able to challenge the British Royal Navy.
Not everything about this, however, was specific to the German case: before the First World
War many states regarded battleship construction as the key to great power status and regarded
maritime expansion as essential for their own survival; this ideology, called ‘navalism’, owed
much to the American captain and naval historian Alfred T. Mahan, whose books were also
widely read throughout Germany.5 Nonetheless, the ambition and persistence of Tirpitz’s fleet
building coupled with Germany’s industrial capacity and her location close to Britain sparked a
fatal naval arms race which contributed to Germany’s isolation prior to 1914. Ultimately, the
German battle fleet proved to be a political and strategic miscalculation: contrary to Tirpitz’s
intentions, the fleet was not strong enough to deter Britain from entering the coalition against
Germany. During the war, the battleships were of little strategic value as they could not break
the British blockade, and the only major clash between the two battle fleets, the Battle of Jut-
land in 1916, ended indecisively without changing the overall maritime balance of power.
In the past, Volker Berghahn interpreted the German naval armament of the Tirpitz era as a
social-imperialistic gamble aimed at stabilising the position of the dominant pre-democratic
social classes. Bound by the long-term Fleet Law, he argued, the Reichstag had no control over
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the Navy, which the Emperor could then use for a prestigious overseas policy designed to
enhance his authority and distract attention from domestic problems.6 Although this interpre-
tation is still influential in today’s literature on the German Empire, there is very little to sup-
port it.7 Certainly the government strove for prestigious successes in its foreign policy, as every
government does, but it seems that the admiralty was mostly interested in having a large navy
so as to enhance its own importance and step out of the shadow of the army. But, most of all,
fleet building on this scale would not have been possible without popular support. And indeed,
the Fleet Laws and their amendments were consistently passed with growing majorities.
This expansion was facilitated by a large amount of literature supporting increased naval
armament, written mostly by German academics – the so-called Fleet Professors (‘Flottenpro-
fessoren’).8 There was also the German Navy League (Deutscher Flottenverein), a mass organi-
sation that also rallied behind the Navy.9 While the Fleet Professors’ pamphlets, resolutions and
articles, as well as the Navy League, mostly appealed to the educated middle class, a popular cult
of the navy in the mass media and entertainment industry attracted a broader public in Germa-
ny, as it did in other countries.10 Much of this public support for the fleet was not completely
spontaneous, as the Navy’s innovative Press Bureau took every opportunity to try to spark
enthusiasm for the fleet.11 However, the widespread public support for the Navy cannot be
explained solely as a result of manipulation by the government. It is therefore more appropri-
ate to assume that the pro-Navy texts, which appeared mostly in 1900, reflect a genuine popu-
lar belief in the importance of the fleet and the sea for the future of Germany.
What conceptions and beliefs lay behind this hypertrophic and ultimately counterproductive
fleet building? First of all, the Fleet Professors’ texts reveal a social-Darwinist world-view: there
were fears of British aggression caused by jealousy of Germany’s growing overseas trade, and
of the imminent carving-up of the world among the established colonial powers, with Germany
coming away empty-handed and sinking into irrelevance. An ever-recurring theme was the
growing scale of German maritime trade, which – unless properly protected – would leave the
Empire at the mercy of any naval power capable of interrupting the sea lanes.12
But there are also domestic aspects of the fleet in the Tirpitz era which, though often over-
looked, link it directly to the navy of the 1848 Revolution. Though the fleet enthusiasts of 1900
certainly had nothing revolutionary about them, the Navy was still associated with the middle
class and its bourgeois values such as liberalism and national unity. The national unity achieved
in 1871 left much to be desired in the eyes of many, as the Empire still displayed many particu-
laristic traits and was split along several fault lines. While historians used to pay much atten-
tion to the different social classes, contemporaries also bemoaned the noticeable divisions be-
tween the north and the south, or Protestants and Catholics.13 The Navy, however, was still
conceived as an unquestionably unitary and national institution. The idea of sea power and the
Navy, as Nauticus’s ‘Yearbook for German Maritime Interests’ put it in 1900, had kept alive the
desire for a unified Germany in the years before 1871, and now the task fell upon it to over-
come the disunion within the nation and direct all minds towards the common goal of the
fatherland’s greatness and glory.14 A professor of economics even identified the disunion and
particularism, which he regarded as typical of Germany, as a bad habit characteristic of the
inland regions. The sea, on the other hand, would train the people for unity.15 The Navy League
also at least imagined itself as a model for national unanimity, uniting Germans of all classes,
regions and denominations. At its 1903 general congress in Munich a speaker combined the eco-
nomic and domestic hopes that were pinned on maritime expansion and predicted that ‘the new
German Empire lies in the sea, where the old Germany’s two-headed dragon – fraternal strife
and poverty – will no longer exist.’16
But the sea also stood for civic liberty, which in the eyes of the fleet’s supporters went per-
fectly well with the idea of a strong monarchy.17 The liberal expectations associated with the sea
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were clearly expressed by the law professor Georg Jellinek: ‘Civic liberty has always been bound
up with ruling the sea. Sea air brings freedom.’18 The public, and especially middle-class, enthu-
siasm for the Navy also fell within the framework of a contemporary debate as to whether Ger-
many should go further in the direction of industrialisation or whether she should remain
essentially agricultural.19 At the centre of this debate was of course the struggle for dominance
between the bourgeoisie, who controlled industry and commerce, and the agriculturally-based
aristocracy. The expansion of Germany’s fleet and maritime trade considerably favoured indus-
try and commerce, while Prussia’s still powerful aristocratic landowners were threatened by
cheap grain imports from overseas. In 1900, Friedrich Naumann made it very clear that the
Navy and industrialisation went together, and that both were directed against the hegemony of
agriculture.20
The naval officer corps was also an opportunity for the middle class to catch up on the nobil-
ity’s prestige and influence. In the army there were a growing number of untitled officers too,
but the higher and more prestigious positions were still a bulwark of the nobility in Wilhelmine
Germany. The Navy, however, was thoroughly middle-class, even at the level of its highest
ranks, although many admirals like Tirpitz himself were raised to the nobility at the peak of
their career. But thanks to the Kaiser’s addiction to his Navy and its popularity, even an un-
titled naval officer could match the standing of an aristocratic  officer in the Guards.21 Socially-
minded left-wing liberals like Friedrich Naumann and Ernst von Halle hoped that Germany’s
turn towards the sea would promote not only the middle class but also the working class. They
called for a combination of expansionist power politics abroad and social reforms at home.22
Naval armament in Wilhelmine Germany was therefore on the one hand a result of a social-
Darwinist conception of international politics coupled with a last-minute panic in the face of the
carving-up of the world. On the other hand, its popularity owed much to middle-class ideals of
a unified, modernised, liberal, civic rather than aristocratic and yet at the same time imperialis-
tic Germany. Only if these domestic expectations associated with sea power are taken into
account is it possible to explain Tirpitz’s fleet and its ultimately counterproductive and hyper-
trophic nature in terms of military strategy and international relations.
National Socialist autarky and the oceans
Even prior to 1914 there were doubts, both in Germany and abroad, about the emphasis placed
on sea power. Geostrategists and writers of fiction could envisage that air power or improved
means of land transport would give continental powers an edge over naval powers, at least in
the near future.23 In the 1930s National Socialist Germany mostly followed this school of think-
ing, and dominance of the sea was no longer thought of as the key to a nation’s greatness. The
new expansionist policy aimed rather at opening up ‘Lebensraum’ (‘living space’) in the east and
creating a continental empire. Likewise, the liberal values linked to the sea in the past were not
honoured in the new Germany. The public lawyer and political scientist Carl Schmitt, in his
booklet Land und Meer (‘Land and Sea’), published in 1942, still associated liberalism, individ-
ualism and hostility towards the authoritarian state with the sea, but at the same time linked
them with the English and with Jews. But, according to Schmitt, the heyday of sea power, and
therefore of British influence, was by now past and the future would belong to the continental
‘Großraum’ (‘Great Space’), which in Europe would be under German domination.24
However, the oceans gained a new economic importance within the framework of National
Socialist Germany’s striving for autarky. Against the background of the difficulties experienced
under the British blockade during the First World War and the effects of the World Economic
Crisis on Germany since the end of the 1920s, and given the political priority accorded to re-
        
armament, economic autarky became a prime objective of National Socialist policy. Autarky was
therefore one element in the guidelines of the Four-Year Plan announced in 1936, which placed
most areas of the economy under state control. Self-sufficiency was almost achieved in many
parts of the agricultural sector, although production of vegetable and animal fats never met the
demand and still had to be imported for hard currency. Economists described this as the ‘Fett-
lücke’ (‘fat gap’).25
One means of tackling the problem was the development of a German whaling fleet. Hither-
to, Germany had already been one of the world’s largest consumers of whale oil, which was used
mainly for the production of margarine and detergents, but it had to be imported from Norway.
Ever since large-scale industrial whaling had started in Antarctic waters shortly after the turn
of the century, Norway had been the leading nation in this activity. Henkel, a major producer of
detergents in Germany, experienced severe difficulties in obtaining supplies for its production,
as imports were strictly limited under the policy aimed at achieving autarky, and most supplies
were directed to the food industry. Hence the company decided in 1935 to build its own whal-
ing fleet, which was actually completed in time for the 1936/37 season. The Walter Rau compa-
ny and the German branch of the Unilever group, both producers of margarine, followed suit
and their newly-built fleets were ready in time for the next season. Other companies from the
same sector turned instead to Norway. They bought one fleet there and chartered another two.
Altogether, six fleets, each consisting of a factory ship and six to nine catcher boats, were work-
ing on behalf of the German industry in the 1937/38 season. An additional fleet was bought
from Norway for the 1938/39 season.26 Despite the fact that Germany had never historically
played a major role in whaling, many German writers on this topic tried to depict this new
industry as the revival of an ancient German tradition, rather than as a completely novel way
of acquiring raw materials. They wrote about the ‘necessity to resume German whaling’27, the
continuation of the ‘old, venerable German whaling’28, or entitled a book Tausend Jahre deut-
scher Walfang (‘A Thousand Years of German Whaling’).29
While the whaling industry had to be built up from scratch, Germany had already had a deep-
sea fishery since the 1880s. Under the National Socialist autarky policy, however, the plan was
to expand it considerably. Fish was meant to replace and complement land-based food and raw
materials that so far had to be imported to some extent. For example, not only could fish replace
meat, but in addition protein derived from fish could be used instead of eggs. Shoes and hand-
bags made from fish skin saved precious leather. Therefore deep-sea fishing was regarded as an
important contribution to Germany’s struggle for self-sufficiency and independence of inter-
national markets. An advertisement by the fishing industry showed a picture of a humble
trawler with the description: ‘Battleship in the fight for alimentary freedom.’30 Consequently,
the state authorities tried, with some success, to encourage higher consumption of fish and fish
products.31 The Germans were told that they should at least double their consumption of salt-
water fish, thereby helping to achieve self-sufficiency in accordance with the Four-Year Plan and
at the same time improving their health.32 The aspiration was for a vast increase in catches, but
this would have required using new, more distant fishing grounds in the waters of Greenland
and Newfoundland. Such long journeys, however, made ships with deep-freezing facilities
necessary to preserve the quality of the catches up to the time of landing. Only two such ships
were actually built, but owing to the outbreak of the war neither of them went into operation
as intended.33 In 1939, whaling and deep-sea fishing came to a sudden end because, just as in the
First World War, the German Navy was not able to keep the sea lanes open and protect German
shipping on the open seas.
What was it that made marine biological resources so attractive within the framework of the
autarky policy? Already at the time of the German enthusiasm for the Navy before the First
World War, deep-sea fishing was occasionally mentioned as part of Germany’s ‘maritime inter-
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ests.’ In this context, the Nauticus Yearbook of 1909 pointed out the advantages of deep-sea
fishing as compared to other resources. The use of conventional land-based resources like coal
would sooner or later result in the depletion of the deposits and was therefore made at the
expense of future generations. Deep-sea fishing opened up a hitherto untapped source which,
moreover, so the yearbook claimed, was inexhaustible, as stocks would always regenerate them-
selves.34
Most of the German literature on marine biological resources in the 1930s followed that path
and envisaged the sea as the ultimate solution to the difficulties experienced under the policy of
autarky. Without the need to spend hard currency, fishing and whaling promised to provide a
new and inexhaustible source of raw materials. All the other measures taken to achieve autarky
could only limit consumption or encourage the efficient use of existing stocks, or they would
lead to an accelerated depletion of domestic deposits. Nevertheless, in the 1930s, there were
already concerns about the sustainability of whaling, which led to an international treaty signed
in London in 1937 and intended to control and limit whaling to some extent. The treaty’s regu-
lations were also incorporated into the German Whaling Law of October 1937. The need for
whaling control was sometimes mentioned in German popular literature on whaling. Generally
these texts considered the precautions taken by the treaty and by German law to be sufficient.35
In 1939, Nicolaus Peters, director of the newly founded Reichsstelle für Walforschung (German
Reich Centre for Whale Research), completely dismissed any concern about whale stocks: Peters
emphasised the vast size of the Antarctic whaling grounds and claimed that whales were fast-
growing and short-lived animals – in other words that they reproduced quite quickly.36 Other
authors also invoked the ‘unimaginable vastness of the southern hunting grounds’ or the ‘infi-
nitely large Antarctic seas’ to calm all anxieties about diminishing whale stocks.37 And above all,
as Carl Kircheiß, an influential campaigner for German whaling, claimed, newspaper reports
about the possible extinction of whales were simply a ploy by foreign countries to keep Germa-
ny out of the business.38
Nevertheless, the German literature still pointed out that overexploitation had to be avoided,
and so it was mandatory to use the whale as completely as possible. This ‘totale Walauswertung’
(‘total utilisation of whales’) was praised as the most valuable German contribution to modern
whaling and to protection of the stocks.39 In actual fact, however, it was mainly economic con-
siderations that prompted German whaling companies to produce canned meat, hormones from
different glands, meat-and-bone meal and vitamins, in addition to the oil. It was even hoped that
the whale’s fibre could be turned into a kind of wool.40 Fish stocks were thought of in the same
way, and accordingly there were no real worries about overfishing, as it would always be possi-
ble to move on to new productive fishing grounds.41
Another element in this perception of the sea was to see it as a colony. If the oceans were a
no man’s land that could be usurped to satisfy a nation’s need for food and raw materials, this
comparison was not far-fetched. Writing about the sea as Germany’s last remaining colony or
as a replacement for the colonies that had been lost actually formed a recurrent theme in texts
on fishing and whaling from this period.42 Germany had been stripped of all her colonies after
World War I, and so calling the oceans Germany’s one remaining colony meant that the exploi-
tation of marine resources, like many other things in National Socialist Germany, was celebrat-
ed as an act of defiance against the alleged injustice inflicted upon Germany after 1918. Against
this background it is striking not only that overfishing was barely mentioned, but that equally
little mention was made of the problem of the conflicting claims of different nations to marine
resources or certain areas of the sea. The outbreak of war banished Germany from the oceans
before the National Socialists had made noticeable inroads into these resources, but if there had
been more time to implement the planned expansion of the industry, conflicts would have been
inevitable. This is especially true of fishing in the North Atlantic, where such conflicts did
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indeed emerge in the postwar period.43 However, within the framework of the autarky policy
too much was at stake for Germany, and the promise of marine resources was too tempting for
predictable problems arising from overexploitation and conflicting claims to be understood or
acknowledged. What was imagined to be the infinite and inexhaustible nature of the oceans
clearly made such concerns unthinkable.
Deep-sea mining for manganese nodules
Given that the greater part of the world’s surface is covered by water, the idea of searching for
raw materials in the oceans is one that comes naturally to mind. In Twenty Thousand Leagues
under the Sea, written in 1870, Jules Verne already envisaged deposits of raw materials under
the seabed that could be used when land-based reserves ran out. And indeed, today’s demand for
oil and gas can only be met by means of off-shore drilling supplementing land-based produc-
tion. However, there were also hopes of marine mineral resources that never lived up to expec-
tations. One of the most fascinating ideas was the project to extract gold from sea water. This
idea was seriously pursued by the Nobel Prize-winning chemist Fritz Haber in the 1920s. Prior
to 1914, Haber had found a way to produce ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen taken from
air and water (the Haber-Bosch process). This invention had a tremendous influence on the Ger-
man war effort because ammonia was needed for the production of fertiliser and explosives.
After the war, Haber thought that the gold dissolved in sea water might be used to help Germa-
ny pay the reparations. Ultimately this proved unfeasible because the concentrations of gold
turned out to be too small. Haber had expected to find roughly six milligrams of gold per ton of
sea water, whereas the actual concentration is on average only 0.0044 mg/t. The gold could
therefore not be extracted in a cost-effective way.44 The project was prototypical of subsequent
ideas, as it was obviously based upon the virtually infinite size of the oceans, which promised
enormous amounts of the desired resource even if concentrations were quite small.
Apart from oil and gas drilling, which is restricted to the relatively shallow waters of the con-
tinental shelf, the project which had the greatest impact on politics, on international law and on
the imagination of contemporaries was deep-sea mining for manganese nodules. Manganese
nodules are mostly potato-shaped objects of roughly five to ten centimetres in diameter. Apart
from manganese, they contain iron, nickel, copper and cobalt. The last three metals are of com-
mercial interest. Manganese nodules cover the abyssal plains at a depth of four to six kilometres
and can be found in all oceans, but especially in certain parts of the Pacific. In the 1870s, the
Challenger Expedition discovered the first manganese nodules, though it was only in the 1950s
and ‘60s that scientists began to regard them as a potential source of valuable ores. Two precon-
ditions had to be fulfilled before manganese nodules could be turned from a scientific curiosity
into objects of great economic and political interest. On the one hand, oceanography and under-
water technologies made considerable advances after 1945. The submarine world was sometimes
likened to outer space, and various uses, such as colonies of aquanauts living on the seabed,
seemed to be almost within reach.45 On the other hand there had to be a need for this uncon-
ventional source of raw materials. The interest in manganese nodules arose against the back-
ground of forecasts predicting the depletion of many continental mineral deposits in the near
future. Such concerns were caused by the rapid economic development of many states after
World War II and the resultant increased consumption of raw materials. Probably the most
popular expression of this perception was the first report for the Club of Rome, the book Limits
to Growth published in 1972.46
One of the first writers to highlight the potential of oceanic mineral resources was John L.
Mero. In an article published in 1968, Mero presented various ways of using oceanic resources,
413
        
including extracting elements from sea water, which was already being commercially done with
common salt, magnesium, and bromine. Mero suggested that it could also be done with urani-
um and, once again, gold. Another possible resource that he pointed out were sediments from
the Red Sea containing iron, zinc, copper, silver, and gold.47 Red Sea sediments were later also
more closely examined by a German research vessel, the VALDIVIA, in the 1970s.48 But manga-
nese nodules were, as Mero put it, ‘probably the most interesting of the oceanic sediments, espe-
cially from an economic standpoint.’49 As Mero saw it, oceanic mineral resources offered at least
three advantages. Deep-sea mining and the preceding exploration would be cheap because the
nodules cover most parts of the ocean floor. Furthermore, many metals, Mero claimed, would be
accumulating faster in the manganese nodules than they were presently being consumed, thus
making the nodules an inexhaustible source of metal ores. They would be ‘a renewable resource,
as is the case with many mineral deposits of the sea.’50 Finally, the legal situation spoke in
favour of manganese nodules: ‘Other advantages of utilizing the ocean floor sediments as a
source of minerals are that they are politically free and royalty free materials.’51
The last point was already about to change when Mero wrote this, because the treasures of
the ocean floor awakened desires on various sides. Against the background of a looming new
form of colonial competition among maritime nations, or a partition of the ocean among the
coastal states (‘national lake solution’), Malta’s ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo,
put forward a revolutionary new concept to the General Assembly in 1967. Pardo proposed that
the ocean floor should be declared the common heritage of mankind. It would not be appropriat-
ed by any state or company. Instead, Pardo suggested, an International Seabed Authority should
regulate the exploitation of the seabed and ensure that developing countries benefited from any
financial gains. Like Mero, Pardo pointed out that deposits of manganese nodules are not only
tremendously large but would also accumulate faster than the world was consuming the metals
they contained. Pardo received considerable support for his Common Heritage Principle,
although the reaction of different states depended on their economic development and their
geographical position. Industrialised countries favoured unrestricted access to the ocean floor,
countries with long oceanic coastlines wanted to see the continental shelf under their juris-
diction extended as far as possible, while developing countries were in favour of regulation by
the UN General Assembly.52
Finally, the issue became one of the topics of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1973-1982). The conference did indeed internationalise the ocean floor,
which together with its deposits was defined as the common heritage of mankind. An Interna-
tional Seabed Authority was established; this possesses an operational arm called the Enterprise.
Originally it was intended that only the Enterprise itself would undertake the actual mining. At
a later stage of the negotiations it was agreed that mining by states or companies would be
allowed, but under strict regulation and supervision by the Enterprise. This included the trans-
fer of technology and profits to poor countries via the Enterprise. Most industrialised countries
still rejected the relevant clauses as a monopolistic, restrictive and dirigiste concept similar to a
command economy. Private companies, it was feared, would face incalculable political obstacles
and risks when forced to operate under a cumbersome supranational bureaucracy. Hence the
Federal Republic of Germany, the USA and others did not ratify the Convention on the Law of
the Sea for many years. Instead they adopted unilateral laws regarding deep-sea mining. Ger-
many only joined the Convention in 1994, after an agreement relating to the implementation
of the Convention took the edge off it. Furthermore, deep-sea mining was by this time no
longer considered a burning issue.53
The Common Heritage Principle was, however, warmly embraced by parts of the public in
Western countries and especially by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, who tried to popularise it on
various levels from the beginning of the 1970s onwards. Mann Borgese participated in the
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UNCLOS III negotiations, first as an observer and later as a member of the Austrian delegation.
She attached great hopes to the Common Heritage Principle and the new Law of the Sea: deep-
sea mining for manganese nodules would imply ‘a new international order for the world com-
munity in general’, and the Convention would be ‘potentially a model for, or nucleus of, a Con-
stitution for the World.’54 The Common Heritage Principle as originally envisaged would, she
hoped, allow poorer countries to boost their economic development and gain independence from
postcolonial structures. It would herald an age of peaceful international cooperation and collec-
tive economic security. According such significance to manganese nodules was conceivable only
because Mann Borgese considered that the oceanic mineral deposits would become the most
important source of raw materials in the near future, and that their stocks were inexhaustible.
In the eyes of Mann Borgese and other supporters of the Common Heritage Principle, the sea
holds the key for a better future at the global level.55
In the end, however, nothing came of it. Manganese nodules have not yet begun to
revolutionise the world economy, much less to initiate a new world order. However, deep-sea
mining is absolutely feasible, as test runs proved. The first successful test took place in 1978,
when manganese nodules were mined in relatively large quantities by the vessel SEDCO 445
in the Pacific. This was achieved by Ocean Management, Inc., a group of American, Canadian,
Japanese, and West German consortia. The German partner was the ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft mee-
restechnisch gewinnbare Rohstoffe’, consisting of several companies from the mining, metals
and energy industry.56 However, from the 1960s onwards deep-sea mining was obviously over-
burdened with expectations that it could not fulfil. The idea began as a cheap and convenient
way of using allegedly inexhaustible deposits of raw materials situated in a no man’s land. For
a start, this view played down the considerable technological challenge involved in mining the
nodules from a depth of five kilometres. Furthermore, the legal and political situation was soon
to change and complicate things further. Later, environmental considerations were added, be-
cause the ocean floor was recognised to be a vulnerable ecosystem. While conditions in general
have turned out to be less straightforward than anticipated, the predicted shortage of certain
metals has not materialised and prices have not risen to levels that would justify investing in
deep-sea mining. Accordingly, deep-sea mining has proved to be a utopian project, a relic of the
late 1960s, when confidence in technological and economic progress was still intact. At least, this
was the situation until very recently. The latest rise in the prices of most raw materials has re-
newed interest in unconventional mineral deposits, and the manganese nodules, among other
oceanic resources, have come out of their hibernation, although at the moment doubts still seem
to exceed enthusiasm.57
Conclusion
The three projects that have been outlined above were not completely absurd, nor should they
be ridiculed. Enhancing the Navy made sense for Imperial Germany to a certain degree, given
the importance of overseas trade and the naval armament of other nations. Similarly, the in-
creased exploitation of fish and whales actually contributed to the drive for autarky. And final-
ly, looking for alternatives to diminishing continental mineral resources was, and still is, a rea-
sonable ambition. Nevertheless, in all three cases some of those involved at the time attached
far-reaching, utopian expectations to the utilisation of the sea. What do the three projects have
in common in this respect, apart from the fact that none of them have lived up to the expecta-
tions vested in them? It seems that there is a set of three ideas or imaginative notions that links
them together.
Firstly, the sea was associated with a better, freer society. The oceans were repeatedly used as
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a starting-point for imagining a better alternative to the existing social and political order.
Whether the issue was domestic liberal reforms in Germany or new, equitable economic and
political relations at the global level, the oceans seemed to hold the key. This notion harks back
to a long tradition in the history of ideas as well as in literature: Plato’s Atlantis and Thomas
More’s Utopia were situated on islands somewhere in the ocean. And Jules Verne’s Captain
Nemo in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea also fled from the oppressive and despotic
conditions on the earth’s surface into the ocean, where the NAUTILUS was his own free-floating
and independent realm. In National Socialist Germany, however, all liberal thought was reject-
ed. Such ideas were denounced as English or Jewish, but nevertheless, at least in the case of Carl
Schmitt, they were still linked to the sea.
Secondly, both biological and mineral oceanic resources were imagined as vast or actually
inexhaustible. Not only the stocks of sea creatures but also mineral deposits were recurrently
envisaged as renewable resources, since they would regenerate themselves faster than they
could be consumed. While this is not necessarily wrong, the capacity of these resources for re-
newal was all too often overestimated. Their supposed infiniteness was the promise which set
them apart from conventional, continental resources and gave these projects such a tempting
and fascinating character. Oceanic resources appeared as the definitive solution to all problems
of raw material shortages.
Thirdly, the perceived infinite, limitless character of the oceans themselves represents the
common denominator of both the notions mentioned above. The sea was the space outside the
known and inhabited world that still appeared to be unclaimed and untouched. Given its vast
size and global extent, limits to resources were almost unthinkable. It was also easy to overlook
the possibility of conflicting claims, as there seemed to be sufficient space and resources for
everyone. Of course the expectations placed on the limitless seas were all too quickly frustrated:
limits became perceptible and conflicts broke out over the use of resources. The recurring
frustration of hopes manifested itself in the evolution of the Law of the Sea. Step by step, the
Freedom of the Sea was curtailed in the twentieth century by the extension of territorial waters.
As a consequence, the oceans have to some degree lost their special character, and have been
brought more in line with the perception of the land.
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Die Weltmeere: Eine utopische Ressource im 20. Jahrhundert
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz folgt einem kulturgeschichtlichen Ansatz und fragt nach Wahrnehmungen und
Vorstellungen vom Meer und den Bedeutungen, die ihm zugewiesen wurden. Dargestellt wer-
den drei Gegenstandsbereiche, in deren Rahmen sich mit dem Meer als Quelle politischer
Macht sowie biologischer und mineralischer Ressourcen weitreichende, oft utopische Erwartun-
gen verbanden, die sich jedoch regelmäßig nicht erfüllten. Bei diesen drei Gegenstandsbereichen
handelt es sich um die deutsche Flottenrüstung unter Alfred von Tirpitz ab 1898, Fischerei und
Walfang als Teil der nationalsozialistischen Autarkiepolitik in der Zeit vor dem Zweiten Welt-
krieg, und schließlich das Projekt des Tiefseebergbaus nach Manganknollen seit den 1960er
Jahren.
Die Tirpitzsche Flottenrüstung wird hier abweichend von der in den 1970er Jahren geprägten
Lesart nicht als antiparlamentarische Krisenstrategie verstanden, sondern als ein bürgerliches
Projekt, das in der Tradition der Flottenbewegung von 1848 Seemacht mit zentralen Werten des
Bürgertums wie der Einheit der Nation und dem Liberalismus assoziierte. Die vom Bürgertum
getragene Flottenbegeisterung erscheint so im Kaiserreich als systemimmanente Bewegung, die
außenpolitische Machtentfaltung, wirtschaftliche Modernisierung und innenpolitische Refor-
men verbinden wollte. Nachdem sich die Tirpitz-Flotte im Ersten Weltkrieg als Fehlkalkulation
erwiesen hatte, verbanden sich in Deutschland weitreichende Hoffnungen mit dem Meer erst
wieder im Rahmen der nationalsozialistischen Autarkiepolitik. Hier erschienen die Ozeane als
der ideale wirtschaftliche Ergänzungsraum, um die Lücke zwischen Deutschlands Fett- und Pro-
teinbedarf und der Produktion der eigenen Landwirtschaft ohne Devisenausgaben zu schließen.
Teil dieser Hoffnung auf das Meer als deutsche Kolonie war die Vorstellung, dass die Fisch- und
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Walbestände praktisch unerschöpflich seien. Die Vorstellung unendlicher mariner Ressourcen
kam erneut Ende der 1960er Jahre auf internationaler Ebene auf. Diesmal richteten sich die
Hoffnungen auf Manganknollen auf dem Tiefseeboden. Vor dem Hintergrund einer befürchte-
ten Erschöpfung der kontinentalen Erzlagerstätten versprach der Tiefseebergbau nach Mangan-
knollen unbegrenzte Mengen wirtschaftlich wichtiger Metalle. Diese Hoffnungen gewannen
eine zusätzliche politische Dimension, da bis dahin kein Staat Ansprüche auf die Tiefsee er-
hoben hatte. Viele Drittweltstaaten, aber auch Stimmen in den westlichen Gesellschaften for-
derten nun, den Tiefseebergbau unter UN-Aufsicht zu stellen und mit einem Transfer des
Know-hows und der Gewinne an ärmere Staaten zu verbinden. Angesichts der erwarteten zen-
tralen Rolle des Tiefseebergbaus für die künftige globale Rohstoffversorgung hoffte man auf
dieser Grundlage eine neue und gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung errichten zu können.
Diese drei Projekte verbindet, dass das Meer jeweils als Ausgangspunkt für weitreichende,
letztlich nicht einlösbare Erwartungen diente. Weiterhin finden sich von drei bestimmten Vor-
stellungen des Meeres jeweils zumindest zwei in allen drei Zusammenhängen: Es handelt sich
erstens um das Versprechen unbegrenzter Ressourcen, zweitens um die Hoffnung auf politische
Reformen, die mit der Nutzung der Ozeane verbunden wird, und drittens um die Wahrneh-
mung des Meeres selbst als grenzenlos und unendlich, so dass die Grenzen der Nutzung und die
Möglichkeit von Konflikten der Nutzer leicht ausgeblendet wurden.
Les mers du globe: une ressource utopique au XXe siècle
Résumé
L’article, en effectuant une approche sur le plan historico-culturel, interroge les perceptions et
les idées que l’on se fait de la mer et des significations qui lui ont été attribuées. Trois domaines
y seront présentés, dans le cadre desquels des attentes à longue portée, souvent utopiques, qui,
toutefois, se virent régulièrement déçues, étaient liées à la mer en tant que source de pouvoir
politique et de ressources biologiques et minérales. Il s’agit de l’armement d’une flotte alleman-
de par Alfred von Tirpitz à partir de 1898, de la pêche et de la chasse à la baleine comme élément
de la politique d’autarcie nationale-socialiste avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et pour finir, du
projet d’exploitation minière sous-marine du manganèse depuis les années 60 du XXe siècle.
L’armement de la flotte par Tirpitz sera ici considéré sous un angle divergent de l’interpréta-
tion marquée par les années 1970, et compris non pas comme une stratégie de crise anti-parle-
mentaire, mais comme un projet bourgeois qui associait le pouvoir maritime aux valeurs cen-
trales de la bourgeoisie, telles que l’unité de la nation et le libéralisme, ceci dans la tradition du
mouvement pour une flotte allemande de 1848. L’enthousiasme concernant la flotte, véhiculé
par la bourgeoisie, apparaît ainsi dans l’empire comme un mouvement immanent au système,
qui aurait voulu réunir un déploiement de pouvoir extérieur, une modernisation économique et
des réformes de la politique intérieure. La flotte de Tirpitz s’étant révélée être une déception au
cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, c’est seulement dans le cadre de la politique d’autarcie
nazie que de grands espoirs furent à nouveau fondés sur la mer en Allemagne. Ici, les océans
apparaissent comme l’espace idéal de complémentarité économique, afin de pallier la lacune
entre le besoin de graisse et de protéines de l’Allemagne et la propre production de l’agricultu-
re, sans avoir pour autant besoin de dépenser des devises. Une partie de ces espoirs, portant sur
la mer en tant que colonie allemande, était l’idée que les stocks de poissons et de baleines étai-
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ent pratiquement inépuisables. Cette idée des ressources maritimes infinies est revenue à
l’échelle internationale à la fin des années 60. Cette fois, les espoirs se tournaient vers les nodu-
les de manganèse sur le fond de l’océan. Avec pour arrière-plan l’épuisement redouté du mine-
rai de fer continental, l’exploitation sous-marine de nodules polymétalliques promettait une
quantité illimitée de métaux à valeur économique. Ces espoirs furent parés d'une soudaine
dimension politique puisque jusque lors, aucune nation n'avait revendiqué de droits sur le sol
marin. De nombreux états du Tiers-Monde, mais aussi des voix dans les sociétés occidentales,
réclamèrent dès lors de placer l’exploitation du sol marin sous surveillance de l’ONU et en
transférant le savoir-faire et les profits, de les associer aux pays plus pauvres. En raison du rôle
central que l’on s’attendait à ce que l’exploitation minière sous-marine joue dans l’approvision-
nement global futur en matières premières, on espérait pouvoir ériger un nouveau système éco-
nomique mondial équitable sur cette base.
Ce qui relie ces trois projets, c’est que le point de départ de chacun d’entre eux était la mer,
porteuse de grands espoirs qui, finalement, ne se sont pas réalisés. En outre, des trois idées bien
déterminées que l’on se fait de l’océan, au moins deux d’entre elles se retrouvent dans les trois
contextes. Il s’agit en premier lieu de la promesse des ressources inépuisables. En second lieu, de
l’espoir de réformes politiques liées à l’exploitation des océans. Et en dernier lieu, de l’image des
mers elles-mêmes, perçues comme illimitées et infinies, tant et si bien que les limites de l’ex-
ploitation et l’éventualité des conflits des exploitants furent facilement ignorées.
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